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Highlights:
•

On average in Europe, countries with higher cigarette prices have less illicit retail trade in cigarettes
(IRTC).

•

Notwithstanding, after controlling for income, increases in cigarette prices are associated with
increased IRTC in pooled regression.

•

As determinants of IRTC, the corruption level of a country matters less than per capita income.

•

After controlling for country-specific unobserved factors, increases in cigarette prices remain
associated with large increases in IRTC (whether measured by illicit shares or illicit volume).

Abstract
Cigarettes are highly taxed in Europe to discourage tobacco use and to fund public-health measures to
mitigate the harms from tobacco consumption. At higher prices (more precisely, at higher differentials
between licit and black-market prices) consumers substitute more toward illicit cigarettes. Illicit retail
trade in cigarettes (IRTC) includes counterfeiting and smuggling—either of legally purchased products,
from lower-tax to higher-tax jurisdictions, or of entirely non-tax-paid cigarettes. The existing literature
includes claims that taxes are not an important factor determining the scale of IRTC. We investigate
these claims with data from 1999–2013 in the European Union. We find that while the simple
correlation between licit cigarette prices and the market share of illicit cigarettes in consumption is
negative, raising prices in any one country would, on average, lead to substantial increases in the
expected illicit market share and volume in that country. A one euro increase in tax per pack in a country
is expected to increase illicit market share by 5 to 12 percentage points and increase illicit cigarette sales
by 25% to 120% of the average consumption. We also find that the role of prices in stimulating IRTC is,
empirically, far more important than the role of corruption. The results are robust to a host of
alternative specifications and sources of data.
JEL Codes: I18, H26, K42, L66

I.

Introduction
Worldwide, trade in tobacco products is subject to an array of taxes and other controls. Taxes

are intended to raise revenue (to fund public-health measures that mitigate the harms from tobacco
consumption or other expenditures, or to reduce other taxes) and to discourage tobacco use (on both
external-cost and paternalistic grounds). Not all taxes imposed are fully paid: efforts to avoid or evade
paying taxes due include counterfeiting, theft and resale of not-yet taxed product, and smuggling—
either of legally purchased products, from lower-tax to higher-tax jurisdictions, or of entirely non-taxpaid products. Estimates of the scope of the global illicit trade in tobacco products vary widely, as
methodologies for estimating criminal activities are necessarily subject to considerable uncertainty and
as many parties conducting such estimates have an interest in their size (Blecher, 2010). An estimate on
the order of $40 billion in annual lost tax revenue globally is generally accepted (Joossens & Raw, 2008,
2012).
We focus here on estimating the relationship between taxes and illicit trade in cigarettes, which
are by far the most popular form of tobacco. Although tobacco usage has fallen in recent decades,
prevalence in European countries still ranges from about a quarter to a half of adults. 1 The illicit retail
trade in cigarettes (IRTC) is, by one widely used source of data, approximately ten percent of the global
retail market (see Figure 1), with a strong upward trend in Western Europe. These shares vary
considerably by country, varying from near zero to over one-half of all consumption in the data we
introduce below. Illicit trade in Europe takes several forms, listed in order of prevalence: 2 contraband

1

Data for the EU from the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2008 to 2013, show country-

level rates for last-month prevalence of tobacco usage ranging from 24% to 47% among people 15-64 years of age.
See emcdda.europa.eu/data/stats2015.
2

Transcrime (2015) estimates average shares of the illicit cigarette market in 2013 for Europe to be 65% for

contraband, 28% for cheap whites (see next footnote), and 7% for counterfeit.

1

genuine cigarettes smuggled in from lower price jurisdictions, whether by large-scale operators or by
casual bootlegging by consumers; “cheap whites,” brands produced mainly for black market sales, 3 and
counterfeit product. 4 In addition to the direct loss of tax revenue, other ills such as violence and funding
for terrorism may be associated with IRTC (Prieger & Kulick, 2014, 2015; Center for the Study of
Democracy, 2015; OECD, 2015; U.S. Department of State, 2015). 5 In the EU, the illicit cigarette market
was estimated to produce €10.5 billion in illicit revenue for criminals in 2012, which is comparable to the
cocaine or heroin markets (Transcrime, 2015).
The influence of taxes—and tax differentials with respect to other jurisdictions—on the
variation in the extent and kind of IRTC is hotly disputed. How taxation affects IRTC is of more than
academic interest; if cigarette tax-rate increases are determined, at least in part, by estimates of the
anticipated decline in consumption due to higher prices, those estimates should account for the actual
prices faced by consumers, which of course are composed in part by the lower prices of illicit cigarettes.
While price differentials present a potential for profit from smuggling, the appeal of such tax evasion
depends also on enforcement—the likelihood and consequences of being caught—and on other risks
associated with criminal activity.
Some analysts find that prices weigh heavily on the incidence of smuggling. According to Goel
(2008, p. 591), in the United States “price inducements remain the main force behind smuggling” and

3

“Cheap whites” are cigarettes produced independently of the traditional tobacco manufacturers solely for the

purpose of untaxed sales. As opposed to counterfeit product, cheap whites are sold under their own brands. (See
Ross et al., 2015.)
4

Counterfeit product is untaxed even if the consumer does not realize it, because some (but not all) counterfeit

packs display counterfeit tax stamps and may be sold to unsuspecting consumers as licit product.
5

A recent OECD (2015, ch.5) report contains excellent discussion of past and present documented links between

illicit tobacco trade and financing of terrorism, and mentions that “[a]cademics have documented connections
between cigarette smuggling in general and to specific terrorist organisations, such as AQIM, the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA), PKK, RIRA and Hezbollah” (p.144).

2

nonprice influences (own or border corruption) are statistically insignificant. Others contend that prices
matter little in determining the incidence of cigarette smuggling, particularly outside the United States.
Merriman, Yurekli, and Chaloupka (2000), looking at cross-sectional data across countries, find that
“cigarette taxes that increase cigarette prices are only one, and probably not the most important factor
in cigarette smuggling. The perceived level of corruption statistically explains more of the variance in
experts’ estimates of cigarette smuggling than do cigarette prices” (p. 385).
Joossens and his coauthors have made the most vigorous claims that prices only minimally
affect IRTC and that other factors are more important. For example, Joossens et al. (2009) write, “higher
income countries, where cigarettes are more expensive, have lower levels of cigarette smuggling than
lower income countries. Other factors, including the presence of informal distribution networks,
organized crime, industry participation, and corruption, probably contribute more to cigarette
smuggling than price levels” (p. 17). Joossens is one of the most highly visible commentators in the
tobacco-control policy arena, and these arguments are widely cited. 6 These assertions, however, are
counterintuitive; economic theory suggests that increasing taxes in one jurisdiction, which—all else
equal—increases the potential profit from evading those taxes, should yield an increase in such evasion.
Experience in a broad range of circumstances is consistent with this expectation, from agricultural goods
(Norton, 1988) to diesel fuel (Marion & Muehlegger, 2008). Indeed, Webber and Wildavsky (1986)
observe that tax evasion has been with us for as long as there have been taxes. Given the importance of
the public-policy issue and the frequent repetition of these assertions minimizing the role of taxes in
stimulating IRTC, these intriguing claims warrant careful consideration.
In this paper we use a more complete set of panel data than the cross-sectional data used
previously, to estimate the relative contributions of prices and other factors to the incidence of IRTC in

6

Joossens has authored or co-authored at least 32 publications since 1991 on tobacco and illicit trade, and these

have over 1,600 citations per Google Scholar (as of yearend 2015).
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countries of the European Union in recent years. We find that higher licit prices for cigarettes within a
country indeed spur more illicit trade, whether measured by illicit market share or quantity. Raising
taxes within a single country by one euro per pack, and holding other things equal, is estimated to
increase illicit market share by no less than 50% and perhaps more than 100%. That means increasing
the quantities of illicit cigarettes consumed by 25%–120%. The main findings are corroborated by a host
of alternative econometric specifications and data on illicit trade.

II.

Policy setting and literature review
Joossens and his coauthors point out that higher income countries (which tend to have higher

taxes and so more expensive cigarettes) tend to have lower levels of smuggling than lower income
countries. We identify several principal claims in this literature.
•

Claim 1a: High cigarette prices are associated with low levels of IRTC.

•

Claim 1b: Raising cigarette taxes does not tend to increase IRTC.

The quotation in the introduction from Joossens et al. (2009) is a typical example of Claim 1a.
Elsewhere, Joossens et al. (2014) state that “our data show that illicit trade is not directly related to
tobacco prices.” Claim 1a follows from the analysis of cross-country data. These authors then use Claim
1a to imply or assert Claim 1b. The latter claim is either taken as self-evidently following from the former
claim, or is part of a general dismissal of basic economics: “[C]igarette smuggling is not caused
principally by ‘market forces’; it is supply driven, and caused mainly by fraud through the illegal evasion
of taxes” (Joossens & Raw, 2003). These claims are not unique to Joossens, but also appear in the
tobacco-control literature more generally regarding countries outside the United States. For example, a
study by Abdolahinia et al. (2013) concludes that “…raising tobacco prices does not lead to increase in
amount [sic] of smuggling” in Iran and another by Ajmal and U (2015, p. 116) finds that “tax increases …
4

have had a minimal impact on encouraging the use and procurement of illicit tobacco” in New Zealand.
The studies that reach such conclusions tend to have inadequate controls for other factors, as we
demonstrate below. We show that market forces in fact work exactly as predicted by microeconomic
theory, after holding other things equal: the fraud and tax evasion occurs because greater price
differentials between licit and illicit cigarettes cause some consumers to substitute toward the cheaper
product.
In other places in this literature, Claim 1b is softened; there the claim is that, while raising prices
might theoretically increase IRTC, other factors predominate:
•

Claim 2: Corruption in a country is a more important determinant of IRTC than are taxes.

For example, in Joossens et al. (2000, p .398): “Tax and price differentials among countries are not the
only determinants of this type of smuggling, and may not be the most important…. Other factors that
make large-scale cigarette smuggling more likely include corruption, public tolerance, informal
distribution networks, widespread street-selling, and the presence of organized crime.” 7 This
formulation treats distribution networks, street-selling, and organized crime as exogenous factors
instead of as endogenous reactions to the opportunities for profit created by the price differentials.
Another argument in the tobacco-control literature is:
•

Claim 3: Examining IRTC in levels instead of as a share of total cigarette trade would lead
to opposite conclusions about the impact of taxes on IRTC.

7

See also Joossens et al. (2009, p.2): “Other factors, including the presence of informal distribution networks,

organized crime, industry participation, and corruption, probably contribute more to cigarette smuggling than
price levels.”
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This point has been made by Stoklosa (2015), who asserts that focusing on illicit-cigarette market share
is “the tobacco industry’s misleading math trick.” The argument is that illicit market share can increase
even as the actual number of illicit cigarettes smoked decreases. Thus an increase in taxes could, in
theory, lead to both a higher illicit market share and a lower illicit level of consumption. Note that, for
European cigarette markets, the basic patterns in illicit market share seen in Figure 1 carry over to illicit
volumes as well (Figure 2). Thus, at least for Europe, we expect to find—and indeed do find—similar
results when we change our dependent variable from illicit market share to illicit volume (see section
IV.B.4).
These claims are the focus of our analysis. We find support for Claim 1a but soundly reject the
other claims. Evidence from other studies strongly suggests that, within the range of empirical
experience, higher taxes bring in greater revenue despite their intended effect of decreasing smoking
and their unintended effect of increasing smuggling (Chaloupka, Yurekli, & Fong, 2012). 8 Our estimates
are consistent with those results, but highlight that some potential tax revenue is lost to the illicit
market.
In contrast to the tobacco-control literature, studies by economists generally find the expected
positive relationship between taxes and illicit trade. The theoretical link between taxation and smuggling
was set forth by Norton (1988), who shows that the aggregate volume smuggled into a country is an
increasing function of the tax rate. When the tax rate rises, existing smugglers substitute supply away
from licit trade, and new smugglers located farther away from the border (and therefore with higher
transport cost) find it profitable to enter the market. A large empirical literature based on data from
North America finds that tobacco smuggling responds to prices as predicted (Baltagi & Levin, 1986;
Becker, Grossman, & Murphy, 1994; Saba et al., 1995; Galbraith & Kaiserman, 1997; Thursby & Thursby,

8

Higher taxes increase revenue if cigarette demand is inelastic, which is well established in the literature (see

Gallet and List (2003) and the studies cited therein).
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2000; Stehr, 2005; Chiou & Muehlegger, 2008; Goel, 2008; Lovenheim, 2008; DeCicca, Kenkel, & Liu,
2013). In contrast, there is less work examining the multi-country European or worldwide markets, and
much of the work is cross-sectional (Merriman, Yurekli, & Chaloupka, 2000; Yurekli & Sayginsoy, 2010).
A recent review of the state of research regarding IRTC cites the econometric literature regarding the
United States but, for Europe, references narrative and case studies only (van Walbeek et al, 2013). The
present research helps fill this lacuna in the literature.

III.

Data on the cigarette industry and smuggling

In this section we describe the data and summarize illicit trade, prices, taxes, and other market
characteristics.

A.

Sources and construction of the data
Countries included in the study are all those in the European Union except Cyprus, Luxembourg,

and Malta, for which market data are unavailable. For countries joining the EU since 1999, only the years
of membership are included (see Table 1 for a list of countries and years). Some calculations below
involve prices in and distances to other countries outside the EU. Such related countries include all other
countries in Europe for which market data were available (including Balkan countries, Turkey, and
Russia).
Data for the study span 1999 to 2013 and come from a variety of sources. Industry statistics
come mainly from Euromonitor International’s Passport database, vintage June 2015. Euromonitor does
not disclose exact methodology for its estimates of the illicit tobacco market, but says that it uses “onthe-ground analysis” as well as “interview and secondary research including estimates made by
governments (customs agencies, revenue departments, etc.), estimates based on seizures of illicit
cigarettes, as well as by companies using other means of estimation, such as discarded, or empty pack
surveys (EPS)” (Euromonitor, 2014b, p.3). Euromonitor also provides a list of sources consulted while
7

developing each country’s estimates. 9 Non-academic estimates of IRTC are sometimes attacked in the
literature for being artificially high, 10 and Euromonitor’s data on illicit tobacco have been questioned by
some researchers (e.g., Blecher et al., 2015; van Walbeek & Shai, 2015), although usually not regarding
Europe. 11 Despite this, after an extensive search for alternative data we concur with Stoklosa (2015) of
the American Cancer Society, who states: “Although there are some concerns around the reliability of
Euromonitor illicit trade data, no other comparable global data exist” (p. 1). As a report for the European
Commission (Pedersen et al., 2014) noted: “Due to the market’s contentious nature, various parties
have vested interests in either deflating or inflating illicit trade figures, though Euromonitor strives to
present the most accepted and realistic estimate of the market”(p. 39). 12 We show below that the
Euromonitor estimates of IRTC are highly correlated with data from an alternative source.

9

For example, five governmental sources are listed for the UK data (Eurostat, Framework Convention on Tobacco

Control, HM Customs & Excise, HMRC - Statistics Illicit, and USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS)), five trade
associations, eight publications from the trade press, 29 company sources, and five other sources. However, no
one statistic in the data is linked to a particular source.
10

In one of the few direct comparison of estimates from academic and industry sources, Stoklosa and Ross (2013)

calculate that 15.6% of packs found in 2011 in Warsaw were not intended for the Polish market, compared to an
industry estimate of 22.9% (the latter source was not Euromonitor). For comparison, the Euromonitor data
estimate that 11.4% of cigarettes in Poland in 2011 were not duty-paid.
11

These criticisms involve the estimates for South Africa, Mexico, Guatemala, the United Arab Emirates, and

Bulgaria. Only the last of these is in our data. The main criticisms leveled against the Euromonitor data by tobaccocontrol advocates is that the estimates are overstated and that there are instances in which the data for a country
are revised retrospectively without explanation. From the evidence presented in Blecher et al. (2015) it appears
that the form of the revisions is typically to adjust the level of the past trend without changing the shape of the
trend much. To the extent that this is generally the case, our fixed-effect estimations below will remove any bias in
the regression estimates caused by incorrect levels of the trends.
12

The report further mentions that “Euromonitor’s business model depends on its provision of non-biased data

that are as accurate as possible. The data have been used in previous reports for the European Commission and its
Executive Agencies” (Ramboll, 2014, p.29).
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Key variables from Euromonitor include the number of licit and illicit cigarettes traded in the
retail market within each country, both in units of millions of sticks. Licit trade includes retail sales of
duty-paid cigarettes, including legitimate sales for consumption in other countries, based on industry
and governmental data. Illicit trade, measured with variable IllicitQty, includes all cigarettes for which
duty has not been paid, and thus includes smuggled, gray-market, 13 and counterfeit cigarettes and any
produced domestically for black-market sales. 14 Legitimate cross-border sales are excluded. From these
two variables, our main dependent variable for the illicit trade share, IllicitMktShare, is calculated as the
ratio of illicit retail-trade volume to total (licit plus illicit) retail-trade volume. To the extent that
IllicitMktShare is mismeasured due to inaccurate estimates of the scale of the illicit market, there will be
additional variance in the econometric errors terms in the regressions and therefore larger standard
errors for the estimated coefficients. However, as long as the measurement error is uncorrelated with
the regressors, it will not bias the coefficient estimates.
Other industry variables include prices and taxes. Average licit cigarette price, CigPrice, is
calculated as the total industry retail value of licit trade in cigarettes (from Euromonitor) divided by total
licit retail-trade volume. The prices, as with all monetary variables in the dataset, are deflated to reflect
the real price in 2010 euros per stick. 15 Prices for illicit product are unavailable. 16 Total excise taxes on a

13

Gray-market tobacco products are produced by a legitimate manufacturer for consumption in one jurisdiction,

but somewhere along the supply chain (often in free-trade zones) are diverted to another jurisdiction, sometimes
without the knowledge of the manufacturer.
14

Cheap whites (see footnote 3) may be consumed in the country of production, in which case taxes for local

consumption are normally paid and the sales do not count toward IllicitQty for that country. Cheap whites are
often smuggled abroad, in which case they are part of the smuggled product counting toward IllicitQty in the
receiving country (Joossens & Raw, 2012).
15

The figures are originally denominated in current euros (using average exchange rates where needed), which are

then deflated using the relevant country’s CPI (from the World Bank).
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per-cigarette basis are in variable ExTax, which is calculated from data on specific excise taxes per stick
(variable SpecTax), ad valorem excise taxes as a percentage of retail sales price (variable AVtax), and
cigarette prices. 17 Other tax-related variables are described in section IV.B.1 below.
Other variables are used to control for potentially confounding factors related to illicit trade and
consumption. Corruption is measured in various ways in the literature. In our main estimations, we use
variable NotCorrupt, a measure of control of corruption from the World Bank. 18 Higher values of this
variable are associated with less corruption in a country. The measure “reflects perceptions of the
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain… as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and
private interests” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011, p. 223). Unlike some measures of corruption,
this measure is suitable for use in panel data because it is comparable across time. The income level of a
country is measured with Gross National Income from the World Bank, converted to real €1,000. 19 The
names, definition, and sources of these and other variables to be introduced below are presented in
Table 2.

B.

Summary of the market
Summary statistics for the data are shown in Table 3. The illicit market share of cigarettes

averages close to 10% and ranges in the EU over the years from virtually nil (0.4%, Italy in 2003) to over

16

Based on informal evidence, Transcrime (2015) assumes that illicit prices are two-thirds that of licit prices for

comparable product.
17

In the nomenclature of excise taxes, a specific tax is levied as a fixed monetary amount per unit, while an ad

valorem tax comes from a tax rate applied to the pre-tax price of the good.
18

Data are from The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2014 Update, available from govindicators.org. A

complete description of the data and methodology is available from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011). Data
are unavailable for 1999 and 2000 and are linearly interpolated from the surrounding years for all countries.
19

GNI data from the World Bank (calculated using the Atlas method) are in current US dollars. The figures are

deflated using the relevant country’s CPI (base year 2010, data also from the World Bank) and then converted to
euros at that year’s average exchange rate (data from Euromonitor).
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half the market (53.8%, Latvia in 2010). Countries with more than 20% illicit market share for at least
some years are Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and the UK (the latter
only in 2000 and 2001). The countries with less than 5% illicit market share in at least half of the years
are Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Prices average 18.6 euro cents per cigarette, and range
from 5.6 euro cents in Latvia upon first joining the EU 20 to 46.4 euro cents in Ireland; prices are nearly as
high in the UK. Excise taxes average about 11 euro cents; the same countries with the extreme prices
have similarly extreme taxes. Corruption and income range widely across the EU. The Scandinavian
countries, Finland, the Netherlands, and the UK have the highest values of NotCorrupt and GNIpc, while
the Eastern European countries (particularly Bulgaria and Romania) have the lowest. Corruption and
income do not move in lockstep: Greece has middling income but high levels of corruption, while
Lithuania and Poland have low income but middling levels of corruption.
As Joossens et al. (2009) and others rightly point out regarding Claim 1a, there is no obvious
correlation between IRTC and taxes. Some countries have high prices and taxes and little illicit trade. To
illustrate this point, prices and illicit market shares for EU countries in 2013 are plotted in Figure 3.
Denmark and Sweden have relatively high prices and the lowest rates of IRTC. On the other hand,
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have the highest levels of illicit market share, while having among the
lowest prices in the EU. If anything, the relation between prices and IRTC appears to be mildly negative
in the pooled data (at least for all but the highest prices), as the line of best fit for all observations
shown in Figure 4 shows.
Of course, correlation in the pooled data does not answer the key question for policymakers: If a
country were to raise cigarette prices (by increasing the taxes) what would the impact be on IRTC? There
are many confounding factors across countries and years, and those differences must be held constant

20

While EU regulations require heavy taxation of cigarettes, newly joining countries typically have a few years to

phase in the higher taxes.
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to isolate the impact of prices on IRTC. Many of the potentially confounding factors, such as corruption,
resources devoted to law enforcement, attitudes toward participation in black markets, and income vary
much more across countries than over time. To illustrate the basic idea behind the fixed-effects
econometrics approach below, consider what the data in Figure 4 look like when the country-specific
time-averages of prices and IllicitMktShare are removed. The remaining within-country variation in
prices and IRTC is untainted by any confounding factor that varies among countries (but not over time).
The positive correlation is obvious in Figure 5 for the demeaned variables. While Figure 4 shows that the
levels of prices and IRTC have little obvious relationship, Figure 5 indicates clearly that increases in
cigarette prices are associated with increases in IRTC. While our main story is evident in Figure 5,
additional regressions will be explored to control for possibly confounding factors that change over time
as well as across countries, such as corruption, income, and factors making prices potentially
endogenous.

IV.

Estimation

The progression of this section is as follows. In section A, regressions using the pooled panel data are
explored to show that the apparent negative correlation between prices and IRTC is due to omittedvariables bias. The impacts of corruption, national income, and IRTC-relevant factors such as prices in
neighboring countries are also explored. In section B, fixed-effects regressions using panel data are
employed to control for unobserved differences among countries that may affect both prices and illicit
activity. Results from a variety of regression specifications and methods, including instrumental
variables regression, show that raising prices indeed leads to more illicit trade. In section C, the
robustness of the conclusions is verified by exploring alternative measures of IRTC, prices, and taxes.

12

A.

Pooled regressions
1. Impact of licit price on illicit share
We begin the econometric investigation of the link between cigarette taxes and IRTC with

pooled OLS estimators. By pooling the data, unobserved differences among countries are ignored.
Instead of examining taxes directly, in this section the key regressor is the log of real cigarette prices,
under the assumption that consumers care about the total price of the product, not the composition of
the price. In any event, taxes are the main driver of variation in prices: Figure 6 shows that most (93.1%)
of the variation in real cigarette prices is explained by variation in taxes. The high correlation stems from
the near one-to-one relationship between taxes and prices, as we document in the concluding section.
(Whether taxes and prices affect IRTC differently is examined in section B.2 below.) The price regressor
is in logs to reduce the impact of outliers due to the right-skewness of the distribution of prices in the
sample.
The simplest possible estimation is a regression of IRTC share on the log of real cigarette prices.
This regression, the results of which are labeled OLS 4.1 in Table 4, calculates the line of best fit through
the scatterplot of the data in Figure 4. The line of best fit by the least-squares criterion, as shown in
Figure 4, has a slope of –0.05 that is not statistically significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.19). If
the same regression is run for the 2013 cross sectional data, the estimate is about the same (–0.07) and
similarly insignificant. Such cross-sectional or pooled regressions provide empirical support for Claim 1a,
although in much of the tobacco-control literature the claim is supported with less than systematic
evidence (e.g., case studies or purely graphical expositions).
Claim 2, that corruption is a more important determinant of IRTC than are cigarette prices, is
based on the observation that countries with less corruption and a stronger rule of law, such as the
Scandinavian countries, have lower IRTC than more corrupt countries such as some of those in Eastern
Europe (Merriman, Yurekli, and Chaloupka, 2000, Joossens et al., 2009). To formally investigate this
13

claim, the estimation OLS 4.2 in Table 4 adds regressor NotCorrupt. The coefficient on NotCorrupt is
indeed negative and statistically significant while the price variable remains insignificant. Thus Claim 2.
However, corruption is correlated with many other characteristics of the country that are omitted from
the regression. In particular, NotCorrupt has 80% correlation with the country’s income level, GNIpc,
which may greatly affect the IRTC share. If so, then the coefficients for price and NotCorrupt in
estimation OLS 4.2 suffer from omitted variable bias. To test this, GNIpc in levels and squares is added in
estimation OLS 4.3. The impact of income on IRTC share is negative, as to be expected in illicit product is
an inferior good: wealthier countries experience less IRTC. 21 More importantly, with income in the
regression, the corruption variable loses significance and the impact of price on IRTC turns positive and
significant. Regression OLS 4.3 provides evidence against Claims 1b and 2, even before correcting for the
potential bias from unobserved differences among countries with panel regression or the potential
endogeneity of prices. Despite the insignificance of the corruption measure, it is included in the
regressions to follow given the importance ascribed to it in the literature as a proposed alternative
driver of IRTC.
2. Impact of IRTC-relevant factors in other countries
Before turning to fixed-effects regressions, we also investigate factors in other countries that
are expected to be correlated with IRTC in the home country. IRTC is an economic activity that depends
not only on prices in the home country but also on other factors that affect the incentive for smugglers
to import illicit cigarettes. Some such factors are the difference in prices of cigarettes between the home
and other countries and the distance to countries with lower prices. If raising the price in the home
country did not in fact have anything to do with increasing domestic IRTC, as asserted in Claim 1b, then

21

Globally, the impact of per capita income is U shaped, but the minimum of the U is far beyond the range of

incomes in the sample, and so the marginal effect of income is negative across the sample.
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after controlling for the domestic price, prices in and distances to other countries should have no effect
(or only a negative impact) on the IRTC share. 22 For example, as noted by Baltagi and Levin (1986), if
taxes do not lead to bootlegging, then tax rates and prices in other places should not affect
consumption. Variables such as distances to other countries do not vary over time, and so cannot be
investigated once fixed effects are included in the model. Thus, these variables are explored in pooled
estimations here.
Many IRTC-relevant variables reflecting conditions outside the home country have been
proposed in the literature (Baltagi & Levin, 1986; Becker, Grossman, & Murphy, 1994; Saba et al., 1995;
Stehr, 2005; Thursby & Thursby, 2000; Merriman, Yurekli, & Chaloupka, 2000; Chiou & Muehlegger,
2008; Goel, 2008; Lovenheim, 2008). Rather than arbitrarily choosing one of the available measures, we
computed many possible measures to show that the regression results are generally similar regardless
of which measures are included. The variables explored here are:
1. LowPrDistEU: The distance (in 1000 km) to the closest EU country with lower cigarette
prices. 23 EU countries are differentiated from other countries between this variable and
the next because travel and transport of goods is easier within most of the EU, due to
the lack of border control and free trade among states. 24 Transcrime (2015) states that

22

Recall that IRTC measured here does not include legal nondomestic purchases (circumvention), so if lower prices

in other countries spur addition legal circumvention, if anything more attractive conditions in the other countries
would decrease the IRTC as a share of total legal sales.
23

Distances for this and succeeding variables are calculated between the closest major cities (defined as having

population greater than 500,000 or the largest in the country) in the pair of countries. LowPrDistEU is missing for
the lowest-priced country within the EU each year. In all these variables, prices are always the real average price
for the country and year as described above.
24

Neither the free travel nor the free trade areas are the same as the EU country list, but there is a high degree of

accord. The Schengen Area, in which there is no passport control, consists of 22 of the 28 EU members and Iceland,
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the most frequent (but not the highest volume) illicit flows are characterized by
geographic proximity. The top two such countries are Poland and the Netherlands.
2. LowPrDistNonEU: The distance (in 1000 km) to the closest country outside the EU with
lower cigarette prices. For about half of the data, the closest such country is
Switzerland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or Algeria.
3. CChubDist: The distance (in 1000 km) to the closest major hub for contraband and
counterfeit (CC) cigarettes in Europe, where the three such areas are Russia, Turkey, and
the Northeast Criminal Hub of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and the Russian exclave of
Kaliningrad. 25 Transcrime (2015) finds that the highest volume of illicit cigarette flows
originate mainly from outside the EU, often entering through these hubs.
4. MaxPdiff: The maximum difference in cigarette prices between the home country and
contiguous countries (whether or not the other countries are in the EU). Contiguous
countries are the easiest sources to access for bootlegging and casual smuggling. Crossborder prices have been found to be associated with cigarette smuggling by Baltagi and
Levin (1986), Saba et al. (1995), Thursby and Thursby (2000), Stehr (2005), Chiou and
Muehlegger (2008), and Goel (2008).

Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. The EU Customs Union, which requires free trade among members and a
common external tariff, includes EU countries and Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, and Turkey.
25

There are other areas of significant smuggling activity, for example in and through the Balkans, but the chosen

three represent the outside-EU sources for most of the other areas. The product often reaches the Balkan
countries from Turkey via Greece. Similarly, the significant smuggling routes through the Baltic states typically
carry product produced in Kaliningrad and transferred via St. Petersburg in Russia to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
See Europol (2011) for details on the areas of criminal activity regarding cigarettes, from which we also take the
term “Northeast Criminal Hub”. The only other significant source that report mentions is the UAE, but including
UAE in the calculation of the variable CChubDist would not change the results because the other three areas are
always closer.
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5. MinPratio: The minimum over all contiguous countries of the ratio of the other
country’s price to the home country’s price.
6. MaxPdiffKM: The maximum price difference per km between the home country and any
other European country in the dataset (whether or not the other countries are in the
EU).
If IllicitMktShare is a true measure of IRTC and Claim 1b is false, then in regressions we expect
LowPrDistEU, LowPrDistNonEU, CChubDist, and MinPratio to have negative coefficients and MaxPdiff
and MaxPdiffKM to have positive coefficients. The first regression results with these additional IRTCrelevant variables are in Table 5, where the new regressors are added singly to the regression
specification from estimation OLS 4.3. The coefficients all have the expected sign, although some are
significant only at the 10% level. Further investigation of MaxPdiff revealed nonlinearities in its marginal
effect on IRTC, and so in regression OLS 5.5 it enters the specification with a three-part linear spline. 26
Up to its median in the sample (a real price difference of 0.074€/stick, or 1.48€/pack, in licit prices),
MaxPdiff has a positive, significant marginal effect on IRTC share. Between the median and the 90th
percentile (0.16€/stick, or 3.15€/pack) there is no significant effect of price differences in contiguous
countries on IRTC share. Beyond the 90th percentile, the marginal effect of MaxPdiff again turns positive,
with significance at the 10% level. Note also that the own-country price effect is highly significant and
about the same magnitude in all these regressions as in OLS 4.3.
In the next set of regression results (Table 6), groups of other-country variables enter the
regression at once. Since some of these variables are proxies for similar notions, it does not make sense

26

th

The knots were place at the median and 90 percentiles based on visual inspection of the partial fit resulting

from a Generalized Additive Model estimation with specification like OLS 4.3 with the addition of MaxPdiff
entering flexibly.
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to add all of them at once. 27 Only one variable pertaining to the distance to a source outside the EU for
illicit product (LowPrDistNonEU or CChubDist) is used in any one regression. Similarly, only one of the
variables comparing the home country’s price with prices in its contiguous neighbors (MaxPdiff or
MinPratio) enters any one specification. Examining all possible combinations among these choices yields
the four regressions in Table 6. We show the results for all combinations of these variables to avoid the
appearance of presenting only the strongest results. The most relevant statistic in Table 6, shown in the
last row, is the p-value from the joint hypothesis test that the coefficients on all the included othercountry variables are zero. This is our omnibus test of whether these variables that are expected to
impact IRTC indeed do so. In two of the regressions, OLS 3.1 and OLS 3.3, the hypothesis that these
other-country variables have no impact on IRTC is rejected at better than the 1% level. In the other two,
rejection is at the 5% level. The results of all these estimations and tests support the conclusion that
higher licit prices and price differentials with other locations lead to higher illicit market shares due to
smuggling and bootlegging.

B.

Fixed-effect panel regressions
The results from estimation OLS 4.3 show that higher cigarette prices are indeed correlated with

higher IRTC shares after accounting for differences in income levels. However, that simple regression
does not address directly whether raising cigarette prices (by increasing the taxes) will increase IRTC
(Claim 1b). Pooled regression does not account for the many ways in which countries differ apart from
the factors controlled for in the regression, and some of those differences must be held constant to
isolate the impact of prices on IRTC. Fixed-effect panel regressions allow us to control for unobserved
country-specific factors that would otherwise bias the estimation.
The fixed-effects model is:

27

Although if we do, the F-test for their joint significance has a p-value of 0.004.
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𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽 ′ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

where the vector x consists of observed regressors including CigPrice, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an econometric error

term representing idiosyncratic differences between the dependent variable and its mean conditional
on the regressors. The fixed effect is 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 , which varies across countries i but not over time. The great

advantage of fixed-effects regression is that any country-specific factor, even those that are unobserved
to the econometrician, are absorbed into the fixed effect. This is important because if such an
unobserved factor “matters” (in the sense that it is correlated with illicit market share) and is also
correlated with prices, then leaving it out of a regression would cause bias in the estimate of the price

coefficient. The inclusion of the fixed effect into the model solves this problem.
There are many country-specific unobserved factors that might be correlated with illicit market
shares and cigarette prices. Attitudes about illegal behavior, enforcement against smuggling and illicit
trade, and travel distances to major source of illicit supply are all examples. While each of these may
change over time, much of the variation is likely to be between countries and not within a single
country. In such cases, fixed-effects regression removes the impact of differing country-level averages
(i.e., the average over time within a country) on IRTC that would bias estimates from a cross-sectional or
pooled regression.
1. Illicit market share and cigarette prices
Table 7 contains several regressions of the IRTC share on cigarette prices, all including country
fixed effects. The first estimation, labeled FE 1, is identical to the specification of estimation OLS 1.3 but
includes fixed effects. Correcting for omitted factors increases the magnitude of the price coefficient,
which is significant at the 5% level. The coefficient of 0.164 in this linear-log regression means that a
10% increase in the real cigarette price is associated with an increased illicit market share of 1.64
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percentage points. The implied average price elasticity of illicit market share is about 3.4. 28 There is no
apparent impact of corruption, most likely because the income level is more important (as seen in
estimation OLS 4.3) and because there is not a lot of variation in corruption within these countries over
this period. 29
There may be trends across all countries that lead to spurious correlation between prices and
IRTC even after controlling for unobserved country factors. For example, prices on average generally
rose across the EU after 2004, as shown in Figure 7. 30 The general trend for IRTC share (shown in the
same figure) is upward during the entire period. If the latter is actually caused by factors other than
rising prices, then the association between prices and IRTC may stem from spurious correlation of
trending variables. Adding year fixed effects to control for such trends 31 (estimation FE 2 in Table 7)
changes the size of the price coefficient only slightly, although the p-value drops to 0.06. The implied
average price elasticity of illicit market share in the sample is 3.3— a sizeable effect.
Even after controlling for time- and country-specific omitted factors, the coefficient on the
cigarette price might not reflect a causal impact on IRTC. In particular, there are three reasons why the
price coefficient in the previous regressions is potentially downward biased. First, given that price is
measured as average revenue, there is measurement error in this regressor. The actual price faced by

28

The price elasticity gives the percentage increase in illicit market share (not the change in percentage points,

note) associated with a one percent increase in price. The elasticity is calculated as the sample average of
𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 /𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 .
29

The “between” standard deviation of NotCorrupt is 0.83, whereas the “within” s.d. is only 0.15.

30

Average price in the EU fell between 2003 and 2004 due to the admittance of several Eastern European

countries that had lower cigarette prices. The newly admitted countries were not required to immediately adhere
to the EU minimums for tobacco excise taxes.
31

Adding year fixed effects to the regression nonparametrically controls for trends, by effectively detrending the

data by removing the yearly mean (across all countries) from each variable in the regression.
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any one consumer in any single transaction will be unequal to the price variable used here. 32
Measurement error in a regressor leads to attenuation bias in its coefficient. Second, there may be
unobserved factors varying by country and year that bias the price coefficient due to endogeneity.
Because licit and illicit cigarettes are substitutes, an unobserved “shock” that increases demand for
smuggled cigarettes may lower the equilibrium price of licit product. This would create an expected
downward bias on the price coefficient. Third, it is theoretically possible (although not likely during the
period examined) 33 that there is reverse causality between illicit trade and tax rates if, for example, the
tobacco industry uses rising IRTC to successfully lobby for lower taxes. This would also create spurious
negative correlation between IRTC and prices and therefore downward bias in a positive price
coefficient. However, taxes generally rose or stayed level in each country in our sample (as
demonstrated in the appendix, section A) and it appears unlikely that reverse causality could materially
affect the results. 34
To investigate endogeneity, we estimated a fixed-effects instrumental variables (IV) regression
using general and excise tax instruments. The general tax instruments for cigarette prices employed
here are LaborTax, the labor tax rate 35 and VAT, the value-added tax (VAT) as a fraction of retail sales
price. Both of these may be expected to be positively correlated with the retail prices of all goods,

32

Assuming the data on revenue and quantities are accurate, the price variable will be correct on average but not

in specific for any given transaction. Such aggregation bias potentially afflicts most market-level demand
estimations in the literature.
33

Joossens et al. (2000) state that Canada and Sweden reduced their taxes in the 1990s on tobacco products

because of concern about increased smuggling. Canada is not in our dataset and the tax reduction in Sweden is
from 1998, predating our sample.
34

The appendix also shows that when the few countries that lower taxes are dropped from the estimation, little

changes in the results.
35

The variable is the total revenue from taxes on employed labor income as a percentage of GDP. Taxes included

are those “susceptible of increasing the cost of labor” (TCU Eurostat, 2014, p.273).
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including cigarettes, while remaining exogenous to illicit-demand shocks since neither is affected directly
by changes in cigarette prices. It is common to instrument cigarette prices with excise taxes (e.g.,
Gruber, Sen, & Stabile, 2003; Stehr, 2005; Nonnemaker et al., 2009). The cigarette-specific tax
instrument we construct, ExTaxHypo, is the total excise tax (in real euros) that would be levied on a
cigarette with pre-tax price equal to the average in the sample. Excise taxes on cigarettes in the EU
consist of a fixed amount per pack (the “specific” tax, SpecTax) and an ad valorem component (AVtax).
Details of the calculation are in the appendix. ExTaxHypo is calculated based on a constant pre-tax price
for all observations to avoid endogeneity from using the actual, potentially endogenous prices in the
formula. While this instrument has a strong claim to exogeneity, it may in fact be partly endogenous if
the fixed component of cigarette taxes, SpecTax, is adjusted by the authorities in some fashion
depending on actual price levels or if cigarette taxes are endogenously lowered in response to
smuggling, which appears to be at most the rare exception across Europe (as shown in the appendix).
For this reason, we perform IV regression both with and without instrument ExTaxHypo. When prices
are in logs, this instrument is, too.
The three instruments labortax, VATrate, and log ExTaxHypo are positively correlated with log
real cigarette prices (the correlation is 0.31, 0.16, and 0.74, resp.). In the first-stage regression of log
prices on the instruments and the exogenous regressors, the coefficients for the instruments are all
positive as expected (see Table 8). The instruments appear to be reasonably strong. The F statistic on
the excluded instruments is 10.26 when only labortax and VATrate are included and 18.40 when
ExTaxHypo is added. The advantage of having multiple instruments available is that overidentification
tests can be performed on the exogeneity of the instruments. The Sargan-Hansen statistic has a p-value
of 0.38 in the former regression and 0.57 in the latter, and so the tests fail to find any evidence that the
instruments are invalid due to endogeneity.
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The second-stage results are in Table 7, labeled IV 7.1 (when the instruments are labortax and
VATrate) and IV 7.2 (when all three instruments are included). As expected, when the downward bias
from endogeneity is removed, the price coefficient rises. Note, however, that the 95% confidence
intervals on the price coefficients are wide enough to include the estimate from FE 7.2. The price
coefficients of 0.371 to 0.386 imply that a 10% increase in cigarette prices (for example, due to tax
increases) causes illicit market share to rise by about 3.7 to 3.9 percentage points. At the mean illicit
share, that would be an increase from 10.0% of the market to 13.7–13.9%. Stated another way, the 10%
increase in cigarette prices would lead to a 37 to 39% increase in illicit market share. The implied
elasticity of illicit market share with respect to real cigarette prices is 7.4 to 8.0. These appear to be
sizable effects. 36
2. The separate impact of cigarette prices and taxes
In theory, consumers should not care about the components of the cigarette price, just the outof-pocket total price. However, we now explore including taxes directly in the regression specifications
for three reasons. First, the policy question has most directly to do with the impact of raising taxes.
Second, some previous studies disaggregated the tax components of the price (e.g., Coats, 1995;
Goolsbee, Lovenheim, & Slemrod, 2010). Finally, even though consumers may not be sensitive to the
division of retail price into tax and other components, suppliers of illicit cigarettes probably are. Taxes
can be fully avoided by illicit supply, whereas the non-tax part of the price reflects in part local cost
conditions that may affect illicit traffickers as well. For the latter reason, if any difference in impacts is to
be found, we expect that taxes have more impact on IRTC than the non-tax part of the final price.

36

Due to limited availability of some of the instruments, the sample sizes in estimations IV 7.1 and 7.2 are lower

than in the first two columns of Table 9. The increased price coefficients are not merely due to composition bias
from the changed sample. If FE 7.2 is re-estimated using the IV samples, the price coefficients remain close to the
original 0.162, at 0.176 and 0.215.
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Since CigPrice = Ppre-excise-tax + ExTax, a linear additive specification is appropriate for the
regressions. Therefore we switch to using price and tax levels instead of logs. In estimation FE 9.1 (Table
9), we first re-run the specification from FE 7.2 but with the price in levels instead of logs. The coefficient
is not directly comparable to those in the previous tables due to switching away from the linear-log
specification, but it is highly significant as before. The price coefficient of 0.685 means that a one euro
cent increase in the cigarette price per stick would lead to an expected increase of 0.69 percentage
points in illicit market share. That is a sizeable effect: the implied average price elasticity of illicit market
share in the sample is 2.74.
Separating the total price into its components yields estimation FE 9.2. The first regressor is the
price including VAT but excluding ad valorem and specific excise taxes on tobacco, and the second
regressor is the total excise tax per stick. The results show that if a distinction is to be made between
tobacco-specific taxes and the rest of the price, then taxes are more important, both numerically and in
terms of significance. An increase of 1 euro cent in the tax per stick is associated with a statistically
significant increase of 1.3 percentage points in illicit market share. The implied tax elasticity of illicit
market share is 2.9, which is similar to the total-price elasticities from FE 7.1 and 7.2. On the other hand,
the non-tax part of the price has a smaller, insignificant coefficient, with an associated elasticity of 0.71.
Instrumenting the price with the labortax and VATrate (estimation IV 9.1, also in Table 9) does not
change the insignificance of the price coefficient, although it increases its size. When the tax variable is
also treated as endogenous (estimation IV 9.2), results are similar. 37
Switching from the linear-log specification in the previous section to the fully linear specification
here increases the chance that outliers in prices or taxes unduly influence the estimates. To investigate

37

Additional instruments used for the excise tax are ExTaxHypo and an index of fiscal freedom from various years

of the Index of Economic Freedom published by the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation (see
heritage.org/index/about). The latter variable takes lower values the higher the general tax burden in a country.
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this possibility, the extra terms in a quadratic expansion in the tax and the rest of the price variables are
added to estimation FE 9.3. 38 The results indicate that the average marginal effect of taxes is 1.71 (pvalue = 0.02), compared to the linear coefficient of 1.41 from the otherwise comparable estimation FE
9.2; prices and taxes are still jointly significant (p-value = 0.02). Coefficients on the higher-order terms
are not jointly significant (p-value = 0.43) and therefore do not appear to be necessary.
3. Impact of IRTC-relevant factors in other countries
The factors explored in section A.2 above, those involving price differentials and distances to
other countries with lower prices, etc., exhibit most of their variation in the cross-section rather than
the time series. For example, if the same other country has the lower price during the sample
timeframe, then the variables for LowPrDistEU and LowPrDistNonEU will show no within-country
variation. Variable CChubDist never varies within country. Thus these variables are less useful once fixed
effects are added to the model, and even when they do vary over time the amount of variation is likely
too small to estimate the coefficients precisely. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness we repeat
the estimations in Table 6 with the fixed-effects specification. The results (not shown) indicate that none
of the additional variables have significant coefficients at the 5% level (although in two of the four
regressions the other-country variables are jointly significant at that level).
4. Impact of licit price on illicit quantities
The preceding sections have established that raising prices or taxes on cigarettes increases the
market share of illicit cigarettes by an appreciable amount. We turn now to Claim 3: is it the case that
the results above are misleading, because higher prices merely shrink the denominator in the calculation

38

Since log price was the original regressor, this procedure can be formally justified as a second-order expansion

(using Taylor’s Rule) of the function log 𝑝𝑝 = log(𝑟𝑟 + 𝑡𝑡), where p is the total price, t is the tax per stick, and r is the
rest of the price.
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of illicit share instead of actually increasing the volume of IRTC? To investigate, we repeat the
estimations from Table 7 with the new dependent variable of illicit quantities instead of shares. In
particular, the dependent variable is the log of IllicitQty, the quantity of illicit cigarette. Note that
differences in the population of countries are largely absorbed into the country fixed effects, and in any
event the log-log specification implies that impacts are in percentage terms. 39
The results, shown in Table 10, demonstrate that the results above are not merely a “misleading
math trick” or “sleight of hand” (to use the phrases of Stoklosa (2015)). First, note that the sign and
significance levels of the price coefficients in the new estimations in Table 10 are the same as the
corresponding regressions in Table 7. Also, note that the size of the impact is not small. The log-log
specification implies that the price coefficients, which range from 0.75 to 2.5, are elasticities. These
elasticities imply that, at the sample average price of €0.186/stick, a 10% price increase would be
associated with an increase in illicit cigarettes sold of 7.5% to 25.4%. At the sample average of 2.524B
illicit sticks/year within a country, those figures represent between 190M and 641M additional illicit
cigarettes traded per year per country on average.

C.

Robustness checks

This section contains several robustness checks to confirm the main conclusions of the previous
estimations. First, weighted estimates are compared with the unweighted estimates above. Next,
alternative measures of illicit trade are explored. Finally, various alternative regressors for prices and
measures of corruption and the rule of law are employed. Out of the 16 additional estimations
performed here, and several more in the appendix, only one fails to concur with our main findings that

39

If the dependent variable is changed to the log of illicit quantity divided by the number of persons of legal

smoking age in the country, the coefficients are similar in magnitude to those from estimations FE 10.1 and 10.2
and the significance levels are identical.
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Claims 1b and 2 are false. In the single exception (noted below), the sign of the price coefficient is also
against Claim 1b but a lack of strong instruments leads to its insignificance.
1. Weighted estimation
Some researchers use weighted least squares (WLS) to improve the efficiency of cross-country
regressions. The difference between the unweighted and WLS estimates can then also be used as a
diagnostic for model misspecification (i.e., misspecification of the conditional mean by not including
relevant regressors or through incorrect functional form; Solon, Haider, & Wooldridge, 2015). 40 In
estimation FE 11.1 in Table 11, estimation FE 7.2 is repeated using the number of persons of legal
smoking age (data from Euromonitor) as weights. The results show that even though the price
coefficient is a bit smaller than in FE 7.2, it has a higher significance level. Given the relatively small
difference in price coefficients compared to the size of the standard errors, there is no strong evidence
that WLS estimation is needed to correct bias in the unweighted estimations.
2. Alternative measures of illicit trade
The Euromonitor data on IRTC, although widely used, are not the only comprehensive data on
illicit cigarettes available for Europe. Since 2006, the UK consulting firm KPMG LLP has estimated IRTC
for the EU in its series of Project Star and Project Sun reports. The reports are funded by Philip Morris
International, the largest producer of cigarettes in Europe (and the world). 41 Despite the fact that the
KPMG estimates of illicit trade are used by the European Commission and national governments, their

40

If the regression specification for the mean is correct, then WLS and unweighted estimation are both consistent

and employing weights should not materially change the results.
41

See Gilmore et al. (2014) for background on the litigation leading PMI to fund the reports for the EU. The earlier

reports are not publicly available; we examined copies under arrangement from Altria Client Services. Data from
the reports on the volume of contraband and counterfeit cigarettes consumed by country (2006-2013), however,
are reproduced in Table 1 of the annex to Transcrime (2015), available at transcrime.it/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/Methodological-Annex.pdf.
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accuracy is contested by some tobacco-control researchers (e.g., Gilmore et al., 2014). Since these data
have been criticized for being provided under contract to the tobacco industry, we do not rely on them
for our main estimations, notwithstanding the fact that Transcrime (2015) states that “despite the
concerns raised by the literature, KPMG data are the best available data on the illicit cigarette market in
the EU” and “…the national estimates produced by Project Star and Project Sun are at present the most
reliable sources….” 42 However, these alternative data can be used to provide additional corroborating
evidence for our main conclusions.
The new dependent variable is the share of counterfeit and contraband consumption out of
total consumption, as for the variable IllicitMktShare used above. 43 The new variable is highly but not
perfectly correlated (r = 0.78) with IllicitMktShare from the Euromonitor data, which shows that the
latter data do not rely solely on data from the industry-funded Project Sun/Star. The estimations here
employ price data from the KPMG reports as well, instead of the prices from Euromonitor. 44 The
repetition of the main estimations (FE 7.2, IV 7.1, and IV 7.2) from Table 7 with the illicit market share
and price data from KPMG yields the analogous estimations reported in Table 11. In estimations FE 11.2
and IV 11.1, the price coefficients are significant and even larger than in the similar estimations using
the Euromonitor data. These results thus strengthen the conclusions found above. The price coefficient
from IV 11.2, however, is positive but not significant, perhaps due to the lower strength of the
instruments here (as shown by comparing the first-stage F statistics between the two tables).

42

Transcrime (2015) goes on to assert that estimates of IRTC independent from the tobacco industry are based on

smaller samples, rely on surveys that have underreporting biases, and are not available annually.
43

KPMG defines contraband as genuine branded cigarettes that have been bought in a low-tax country and which

exceed legal border limits or were acquired without taxes for export purposes to be illegally resold in a higher
priced market. Contraband includes small scale (bootlegging) and wholesale (organized crime) smuggling. Cheap
whites are also included in estimates of contraband and counterfeit product.
44

Given that the correlation between the price variables from the two sources is 0.986, it makes little difference to

the results which is used in the regressions here.
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We also explore a third measure of IRTC. To complement the estimations using the Euromonitor
and KPMG data, we calculated our own estimates of illicit market share. Our consumption gap analysis
has the advantage of avoiding industry- and third-party estimates of IRTC that lack completely
transparent methodology. Following the approach suggested by Blecher (2010), we compare survey
estimates of total cigarette consumption within each country to the amount of licit sales and ascribe
gaps between the two to consumption of illicitly obtained cigarettes. Construction of the data and the
analysis contains many steps, which are detailed in the appendix. The results, also in the appendix,
provide further evidence that licit cigarette prices have sizeable and statistically significant positive
impacts on illicit market share. The marginal effects of price on IRTC by this method are estimated to be
somewhat larger than our main results above, although the appendix discusses why there may be some
upward bias.
3. Alternative regressors
The European Commission collects data on cigarette prices and taxes that can be used as
alternatives to the data from Euromonitor. Details on these data are in the appendix. Using this
alternative source, the variable CigPrice and the instruments VAT and ExTaxHypo are reconstructed and
employed in regressions similar to FE 7.2, IV 7.1, and IV 7.2. The results are in Table 12. In all
estimations, the price coefficients are similar in magnitude and significance to the analogous estimations
in Table 7, except that the coefficient has a higher level of significance in estimation FE 12.1 than in FE
7.2.
Finally, there are many other control variables that can be used in place of the particular
measure of corruption employed above. Our conclusions, particularly those regarding Claim 2, should
not rest only on one specific corruption measure. Accordingly, we repeat estimation OLS 4.3 with
several other regressors in place of NotCorrupt. The alternatives include corruption measures from
Transparency International, indices of a country’s rule of law and the effectiveness of government from
29

the World Bank, and United Nations data on police per capita. See the appendix for information on
these variables.
The results, in Table 13, are virtually identical to OLS 4.3. Claim 2 is rejected in each regression,
whether the alternative regressors are included singly or jointly (the latter in estimation OLS 13.6): none
of the alternative measures are statistically significant, while the coefficient on price remains highly
significant. 45 Furthermore, the size of the price coefficient is essentially the same as that found in
estimation OLS 4.3, ranging only from 0.10 to 0.11. When two-way fixed-effects regressions similar to FE
7.2 are estimated with these alternatives to NotCorrupt, the results (see Table 14) again are in accord
with Claim 2 and the price coefficient remains significant and changes little.

V.

Policy discussion and conclusions
Table 15 summarizes the results of the various regressions. The elasticities are generally large,

ranging from 3.3 to 8.0 for illicit share and from 0.8 to 2.5 for illicit quantity. In all cases for the latter,
the confidence interval for the elasticity admits the elastic region (greater than one), indicating that IRTC
is highly responsive to licit cigarette prices. 46 The table also shows the estimated effects of €1/pack tax
increase within a single country. A regression with country and year fixed effects (and no other
regressors; results not shown) shows that a €1/pack tax increase may be expected to raise prices by
€1.13/pack on average. Remarkably similar tax pass-through rates for cigarettes were also found in US
markets by Keeler et al. (1996) and Sullivan and Dutkowsky (2012); pass-through was 1.11 in the former
study and 1.07 to 1.14 in the latter. Our estimate is also between the bounding estimates of Delipalla

45

Results for the index on government effectiveness are not shown in the tables since they are nearly identical to

those for the index on the rule of law.
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It is well known that the price elasticity for cigarette consumption is inelastic. The elasticity reported here,

however, is a cross-price elasticity (from licit prices to illicit sales).
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and O’Donnell (2001) for cigarette tax pass-through in European markets. 47 That price increase, coupled
with the fitted models in Table 7 and Table 10, allows calculation of the expected change in illicit market
share or illicit cigarette quantities.
The estimates are calculated as the average of the discrete changes in the dependent variable in
the sample. For the market share, the estimated change due to the price increase for a country and year
is
Δ𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

and the average discrete change is

𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 (Δ𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )) = 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 (Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )

where 𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 denotes the (unweighted) empirical average operator. For the illicit quantity, the calculation is
more involved since the dependent variable is in logs. Assuming the error term in the regressions for log

quantity is normally distributed with variance 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2 conditional on the regressors, the estimated change in
quantity from the price change is

Δ𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) = exp �𝛽𝛽 ′ 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +

𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2
� − exp �𝛽𝛽 ′ 𝑥𝑥0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + �
2
2

where 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes the regressor vector after the price change and 𝑥𝑥0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is before. 48 Since the only
element of x that changes is the price, the expression on the right can be written
Δ𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) = exp �𝛽𝛽 ′ 𝑥𝑥0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +

47

𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2
� �exp�𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � − 1�
2

These authors split their sample into a group comprising Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, and

UK, which had ad valorem pass-through of 0.7 and specific-excise pass-through of 0.9, and a second group
containing France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain, which had ad valorem pass-through of 1.5 and
specific-excise pass-through of 2.2. Our total excise pass-through estimate of 1.1 lies within these bounds, as
would be expected due to averaging across countries and tax types.
48

The expression follows from the formula for the mean of a lognormally distributed random variable.
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Again, the average discrete change is calculated as the empirical average of the above expression.
Asymptotic standard errors for these estimates are calculated via the delta method.
The price increase is associated with an expected 5 percentage points of illicit market share from
the fixed-effects regression (see the first two rows of Table 15). This is a large increase when compared
to the average illicit share of 10.1% in the sample. If the IV regression estimates are used instead for the
calculations, the implied impact is between 11 and 12 percentage points. The price increase is estimated
from the fixed-effects regressions to lead to additional illicit sales of between 620 and 647 million
cigarettes within a country and year; the IV estimates are an additional 2.4 to 3.0 billion sticks. Again,
these are large impacts compared to the average illicit volume of 2.5 billion sticks—increases of 25% to
120% of the average.
In conclusion, we find that while the overall correlation between licit cigarette prices and illicit
market share is negative, raising prices in any one country would lead, ceteris paribus, to substantial
increases in the expected illicit market share and volume. The role of prices in stimulating IRTC is far
more empirically important than that of corruption, at least in the European data examined here.
Finally, the same general conclusions about the importance and impact of prices on IRTC hold whether
examining illicit market shares or illicit volumes.
How can it be that Claim 1a is true but Claim 1b is false? Such “sign reversal” of a coefficient is
familiar to researchers working with panel data in which unobserved unit-specific factors are likely to
cause severe bias. The present data exhibit the well-known Simpson’s Paradox: a trend that appears in
different groups of data can disappear or be reversed in the aggregate. The latter is Claim 1a; the former
is Claim 1b. There is no actual paradox, once the distinction between causality and mere correlation is
made (Pearl, 2009, ch. 6).
This analysis addresses only one consideration in determining how cigarettes should be taxed.
The econometric results are for the expected impacts on illicit trade of raising prices while holding all
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else fixed, and do not speak to direct or indirect effects of other policy measures that may accompany
taxation. Policymakers need not (and should not) leave enforcement and other activity designed to
further compliance unchanged if they intend to increase taxes. It is also important to note that the
impacts of raising prices that we estimate are for a country unilaterally raising its tax. Since the work
above showed that price differentials among countries affect IRTC, raising or lowering prices to
harmonize them across the EU would not necessarily lead to similar changes in illicit activity. In any case,
the impact on illicit trade is only one aspect of policy analysis of increasing cigarette prices. A complete
cost-benefit analysis of tax policy toward tobacco would include the expected impacts on tax revenue
and public health in addition to the unintended consequences examined here.
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Tables
Table 1: Countries and years included in the data
Country

First year

Last year

Country

First year

Last year

Austria

1999

2013

Italy

1999

2013

Belgium

1999

2013

Latvia

2004

2013

Bulgaria

2007

2013

Lithuania

2004

2013

Croatia

2013

2013

Netherlands

1999

2013

Czech Republic

2004

2013

Poland

2004

2013

Denmark

1999

2013

Portugal

1999

2013

Estonia

2004

2013

Romania

2007

2013

Finland

2000

2013

Slovakia

2004

2013

France

1999

2013

Slovenia

2004

2013

Germany

1999

2013

Spain

1999

2013

Greece

1999

2013

Sweden

2000

2013

Hungary

2004

2013

United Kingdom

1999

2013

Ireland

1999

2013

Note: not all years appear in all estimation, due to missing values of regressors or (in the case of Croatia)
the inclusion of fixed effects.
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Table 2: Variables and definitions
Variable Name

Definition

Source

IllicitMktShare

illicit market share

EM

IllicitQty

illicit cigarette quantity (M sticks)

EM

CigPrice

cigarette price per stick, calculated as average revenue

EM

PriceLessTax

cigarette price per stick, not including excise tax

EM

ExTaxHypo

hypothetical excise tax

EM

LaborTax

TCU Eurostat (2014)

VAT

total revenue from taxes on employed labor income as a
percentage of GDP
index of fiscal freedom from the Index of Economic
Freedom
general VAT as a percentage of retail sales price

SpecTax

specific excise tax per stick

EM

AVtax

ad valorem excise tax rate on cigarettes, as a percentage
of retail sales price
excise tax on cigarettes per stick (does not include VAT)

EM

FiscalFreedom

ExTax
LowPrDistEU

the distance (in 1000 km) to the closest EU country with
a lower cigarette price.
LowPrDistNonEU
the distance (in 1000 km) to the closest country outside
the EU with a lower real average cigarette price
CChubDist
The distance (in 1000 km) to the closest major hub for
contraband and counterfeit cigarettes in Europe: Russia,
Turkey, or the Northeast Criminal Hub of Lithuania,
Estonia, Latvia, and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad
MaxPdiff
the maximum difference in cigarette prices between the
home country and contiguous countries
MinPratio
the minimum over all contiguous countries of the ratio of
the other country’s price to the home country’s price
MaxPdiffKM
the maximum price difference per km between the home
country and any other country included in the dataset
GNIpc
gross national income (GNI; Atlas method) per capita
(€1,000)
NotCorrupt
control of corruption, an index measuring “perceptions of
the extent to which public power is exercised for private
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption,
as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private
interests” (the index ranges from -2.5 [weak governance]
to 2.5 [strong governance]).
Note: all monetary amounts are converted to real 2010 euros.

Heritage Foundation
EM

EM
Authors’ calculations
Authors’ calculations
Authors’ calculations

Authors’ calculations
Authors’ calculations
Authors’ calculations
World Bank WGI
World Bank WGI
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable

Obs

Mean

S.d.

Min

Max

IllicitMktShare

302
302
302
302
302
262
262
266
302
288

0.101
2,524.4
7.171
0.186
-1.778
0.075
0.075
16.767
59.917
16.963

0.091
2,827.5
1.263
0.084
0.435
0.034
0.042
4.202
16.367
1.679

0.004
5.000
4.043
0.056
-2.882
0.006
0.019
9.031
29.000
1.000

0.538
14,828.0
9.604
0.464
-0.768
0.196
0.233
26.893
9.000
21.000

262
263
302
287
302
302
301
301
302
302
302

0.050
33.165
0.109
0.479
0.587
1.130
0.070
0.589
0.000
22.792
1.182

0.048
15.109
0.054
0.537
0.372
0.779
0.063
0.325
0.000
11.482
0.832

0.004
0.000
0.017
0.065
0.065
0.088
-0.094
0.109
0.000
1.719
-0.304

0.227
6.000
0.284
3.610
2.450
3.270
0.243
1.376
0.002
47.120
2.586

IllicitQty

Log(IllicitQty)
CigPrice

Log(CigPrice)
PriceLessTax
ExTaxHypo
LaborTax
FiscalFreedom
VAT
SpecTax
AVtax
ExTax
LowPrDistEU
LowPrDistNonEU
CChubDist
MaxPdiff
MinPratio
MaxPdiffKM
GNIpc
NotCorrupt

Data cover years 1999 to 2013; some years are unavailable for some variables.
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Table 4: Pooled OLS regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices

Y = illicit market share
Log(real cigarette price)

OLS 4.1

OLS 4.2

OLS 4.3

Coefficient (s.e.)

Coefficient (s.e.)

Coefficient (s.e.)

-0.050

-0.002

0.098

(0.037)

(0.039)

(0.032)***

-0.039

-0.007

(0.019)**

(0.015)

Freedom from Corruption
(WGI)
Income (GNI) per capita
(€1,000)

-0.019
(0.005)***

GNI per capita squared

0.000
(0.000)***

constant
F statistic
R2
Adjusted R2
N

0.012

0.144

0.534

(0.065)

(0.086)

(0.109)***

1.80
0.057
0.054
302

2.97
0.133
0.127
302

5.44
0.332
0.323
302

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country.
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Table 5: Pooled OLS regressions of IRTC share on other-country IRTC-relevant variables

Y = illicit market share
Log(real cigarette price)
Distance to closest EU
country with lower price
Distance to closest non-EU
country with lower price
Distance to closest
smuggling area
Max. price difference with
contiguous countries (X1)
Max. price difference
(X1) below its median
Max. price diff. (X1) between its
median and 90th percentile
Max. price diff. (X1) above its
90th percentile
Minimum ratio: other contiguous
country price ÷ own price
Max. price difference/KM
Freedom from Corruption
(WGI)
Income (GNI) per capita
(€1,000)
GNI per capita squared
constant
F
R^2
Adjusted R^2
N

OLS 5.1

OLS 5.2

OLS 5.3

OLS 5.4

OLS 5.5

OLS 5.6

OLS 5.7

Coef. (s.e.)

Coef. (s.e.)

Coef. (s.e.)

Coef. (s.e.)

Coef. (s.e.)

Coef. (s.e.)

Coef. (s.e.)

0.091
(0.032)***
-0.035
(0.011)***

0.115
(0.031)***

0.115
(0.034)***

0.095
(0.030)***

0.097
(0.028)***

0.080
(0.029)**

0.081
(0.029)**

-0.043
(0.023)*
-0.025
(0.012)*
0.258
(0.137)*
0.586
(0.277)**
-0.368
(0.493)
0.802
(0.435)*
-0.056
(0.032)*

0.003
(0.013)
-0.020
(0.005)***
0.000
(0.000)***
0.547
(0.115)***
4.15
0.375
0.364
287

-0.006
(0.014)
-0.021
(0.005)***
0.000
(0.000)***
5.66
0.352
0.341

302

-0.010
(0.015)
-0.017
(0.005)***
0.000
(0.000)***
0.581
(0.118)***
4.54
0.368
0.357
302

-0.010
(0.016)
-0.018
(0.005)***
0.000
(0.000)***
0.470
(0.101)***
4.50
0.361
0.350
301

0.000
(0.019)
-0.018
(0.005)***
0.000
(0.000)***
0.456
(0.106)***
8.66
0.377
0.362
301

-0.008
(0.015)
-0.018
(0.005)***
0.000
(0.000)***
0.538
(0.106)***
4.52
0.367
0.356
301

66.682
(27.686)**
-0.020
(0.017)
-0.020
(0.004)***
0.000
(0.000)***
0.528
(0.093)***
6.25
0.377
0.366
302

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country.
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Table 6: Additional Pooled OLS regressions of IRTC share on other-country IRTC-relevant variables
OLS 3.1

OLS 3.2

OLS 3.3

OLS 3.4

Y = illicit market share

Coefficient (s.e.)

Coefficient (s.e.)

Coefficient (s.e.)

Coefficient (s.e.)

Log(real cigarette price)

0.079
(0.043)*
-0.031
(0.012)**
0.014
(0.050)

0.084
(0.040)**
-0.034
(0.011)***
0.017
(0.048)

0.100
(0.023)***
-0.030
(0.013)**

0.101
(0.027)***
-0.035
(0.011)***

-0.015
(0.014)
0.022
(0.333)
-0.519
(0.480)
0.981
(0.421)**

-0.011
(0.016)

Distance to closest EU country with
lower price
Distance to closest non-EU country with
lower price
Distance to closest smuggling area
Max. price difference with contiguous
countries (X1) below its median
Max. price diff. (X1) between its
median and 90th percentile
Max. price diff. (X1) above its
90th percentile
Minimum ratio: other contiguous country’s
price ÷ home country price
Maximum price difference/KM
Freedom from Corruption (WGI)
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000)
GNI per capita squared
_cons
F (all regressors)
R^2
Adjusted R^2
N
P-value for H0: all other-country coefficients are zero

0.131
(0.282)
-0.330
(0.550)
0.753
(0.431)*

73.389
(30.507)**
-0.011
(0.020)
-0.020
(0.005)***
0.000
(0.000)***
0.495
(0.140)***
5.76
0.426
0.405
287
0.0050

-0.004
(0.046)
71.191
(35.014)*
-0.013
(0.017)
-0.020
(0.005)***
0.000
(0.000)***
0.518
(0.125)***
3.33
0.418
0.401
287
0.0302

65.407
(31.829)*
-0.011
(0.019)
-0.019
(0.005)***
0.000
(0.000)***
0.564
(0.106)***
6.40
0.432
0.411
287
0.0022

0.020
(0.042)
64.642
(36.316)*
-0.013
(0.016)
-0.021
(0.004)***
0.000
(0.000)***
0.567
(0.106)***
3.68
0.420
0.403
287
0.0189

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 7: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices
Y = illicit market share

FE 7.1

Log(real cigarette price)
Freedom from Corruption (WGI)
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000)
GNI per capita squared
Country fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Weighted estimation
1st stage F statistic on excluded instruments
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value)
N

FE 7.2

IV 7.1

IV 7.2

0.164

0.162

0.386

0.371

(0.061)**

(0.083)*

(0.140)***

(0.143)***

-0.002

0.022

0.010

-0.014

(0.028)

(0.041)

(0.052)

(0.044)

0.001

0.006

-0.009

-0.007

(0.002)

(0.004)

(0.009)

(0.009)

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

Y
N
N

Y
Y
N

302

302

Y
Y
N
10.26
0.381
263

Y
Y
N
20.13
0.597
238

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country.

Note: In estimation IV 7.1, the instruments for price are LaborTax and VAT as described in the text; in IV 7.2 instrument ExTaxHypo is also used.
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Table 8: First-stage regressions for the IV regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices
IV 7.1, 1st stage

Y = Log(real cigarette price)
VAT

IV 7.2, 1st stage

0.053

0.039

(0.014)***

(0.011)***

LaborTax

0.025

0.037

(0.015)

(0.013)***

ExTaxHypo

0.326
(0.059)***

Freedom from Corruption (WGI)
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000)
GNI per capita squared

-0.014

-0.002

(0.052)

(0.044)

-0.009

-0.007

(0.009)

(0.009)

-0.000

-0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

263

238

N

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country.

Note: Both estimations include country and year fixed effects.
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Table 9: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices and taxes
Y = illicit market share

FE 9.1

Real cigarette price, including tax

FE 9.2

IV 9.1

IV 9.2

FE 9.3

0.685
(0.242)***

Real cigarette price, not including
excise tax
Real excise tax per stick
Freedom from Corruption (WGI)
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000)
GNI per capita squared

0.467

1.022

1.287

0.140

(0.412)

(0.952)

(0.814)

(0.882)

1.342

1.159

1.212

2.134

(0.491)**

(0.547)**

(0.589)**

(1.871)

0.017

0.021

0.028

0.025

0.023

(0.029)

(0.024)

(0.031)

(0.032)

(0.026)

0.011

0.007

0.009

0.009

0.008

(0.008)

(0.008)

(0.007)

(0.008)

(0.007)

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

Real cigarette price, not including
excise tax, squared
Real excise tax per stick, squared

-11.582
(11.594)

-8.285
(10.798)

(Cigarette price w/o excise
tax)×(excise tax per stick)
Joint test of all price & tax
coefficients (p-value)
Joint test of price & tax higher-order
coefficients (p-value)
Country fixed effects
Year fixed effects
N

17.725
(17.958)

0.0273
0.6840
Y
Y
302

Y
Y
262

Y
Y
238

Y
Y
238

Y
Y
262

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country.

Note: In estimation IV 9.1, the instruments for price are LaborTax and VAT as described in the text; in IV 9.2 the tax is also treated as
endogenous and instruments ExTaxHypo and FiscalFreedom are also used.
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Table 10: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC quantities on cigarette prices
Y = log illicit cigarette qty

FE 10.1

Log(real cigarette price)
Freedom from Corruption (WGI)
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000)
GNI per capita squared
Country fixed effects
Year fixed effects
N

FE 10.2

IV 10.1

IV 10.2

0.780

0.752

2.538

2.214

(0.325)**

(0.405)*

(0.930)***

(0.636)***

0.067

-0.046

-0.279

-0.287

(0.251)

(0.368)

(0.473)

(0.376)

0.044

0.095

-0.016

0.017

(0.026)

(0.047)*

(0.073)

(0.072)

-0.001

-0.001

0.000

-0.000

(0.000)

(0.001)*

(0.001)

(0.001)

Y
Y
302

Y
Y
263

Y
Y
238

Y
N
302

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SEs (in parentheses) account for clustering by country.

Note: In estimation IV 10.1, the instruments for price are LaborTax and VAT as described in the text; in IV 10.2 instrument ExTaxHypo is also
used.
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Table 11: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices (WLS and alternative dependent variable)
Y = illicit market share
Source for dependent variable:
Log(real cigarette price)
Freedom from Corruption (WGI)
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000)
GNI per capita squared
Weighted least squares estimation
1st stage F statistic on excluded instruments
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value)
N

FE 11.1

FE 11.2

IV 11.1

IV 11.2

Euromonitor
0.120

KPMG
0.216

KPMG
0.478

KPMG
0.257

(0.027)***

(0.104)**

(0.205)**

(0.176)

-0.005

-0.003

-0.041

-0.009

(0.029)

(0.037)

(0.056)

(0.045)

0.008

-0.000

-0.010

-0.002

(0.004)**

(0.010)

(0.014)

(0.011)

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

Y

N

302

166

N
4.23
0.274
166

N
10.1
0.150
166

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country.

Note: In estimation FE 11.1, the observations are weighted with the legal smoking population. In estimation IV 11.1, the instruments for price
are LaborTax and VAT as described in the text; in IV 11.2 instrument ExTaxHypo is also used. All estimations include country and year fixed
effects.
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Table 12: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices (alternative price and tax data from the European
Commission)
Y = illicit market share

FE 12.1

Log(real cigarette price)
Freedom from Corruption (WGI)
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000)
GNI per capita squared

IV 12.2

0.187

0.403

0.348

(0.087)**

(0.123)***

(0.108)***

0.026

0.015

0.021

(0.040)

(0.053)

(0.048)

-0.011

0.001

-0.015

(0.005)

(0.010)

(0.008)

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)*

(0.000)

303

7.37
0.242
266

19.39
0.332
266

st

1 stage F statistic on excluded instruments
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value)
N

IV 12.1

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country.

Note: Data from the European Commission for price and taxes are used in these estimations. In estimation IV 12.1, the instruments for price are
LaborTax and VAT as described in the text; in IV 12.2 instrument ExTaxHypo is also used. All estimations include country and year fixed effects.
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Table 13: Pooled OLS regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices (alternative corruption and rule of law regressors)

Y = illicit market share
Log(real cigarette price)
Corruption Perceptions Index (TPI)

OLS 13.1

OLS 13.2

OLS 13.3

OLS 13.4

OLS 13.5

OLS 13.6

Coef. (se)

Coef. (se)

Coef. (se)

Coef. (se)

Coef. (se)

Coef. (se)

0.099

0.099

0.098

0.108

0.114

0.112

(0.039)**

(0.030)***

(0.030)***

(0.036)***

(0.035)***

(0.040)***

0.000

-0.001

(0.001)

(0.001)

Corruption Rank (TPI)

-0.073

0.073

(0.080)

(0.169)

Rule of Law (WGI)

0.024

0.084

(0.019)

(0.053)

Police per 100,000 people
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000)
GNI per capita squared
constant
Year fixed effects
F statistic
R2
Adjusted R2
N

-2.47E-05

-2.15E-04

6.54E-05

(8.47E-05)

(2.29E-04)

(1.22E-04)

-0.017

-0.021

-0.021

-0.022

-0.022

-0.022

(0.005)***

(0.004)***

(0.004)***

(0.005)***

(0.004)***

(0.005)***

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

(0.000)**

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

0.515

0.566

0.532

0.572

0.589

-0.022

(0.133)***

(0.113)***

(0.100)***

(0.115)***

(0.114)***

(0.005)***

Y
2.96
0.383
0.344
302

N
5.98
0.335
0.326
302

N
6.53
0.338
0.330
302

N
6.52
0.365
0.355
263

N
6.39
0.377
0.367
249

Y
25.12
0.455
0.410
263

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country.
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Table 14: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices (alternative corruption and rule of law regressors)

Y = illicit market share
Log(real cigarette price)
Corruption Perceptions Index (TPI)

FE 14.1

FE 14.2

FE 14.3

FE 14.4

FE 14.5

FE 14.6

Coef. (se)

Coef. (se)

Coef. (se)

Coef. (se)

Coef. (se)

Coef. (se)

0.164

0.185

0.162

0.209

0.212

0.210

(0.078)**

(0.083)**

(0.076)**

(0.086)**

(0.086)**

(0.087)**

-0.001

-0.000

(0.001)

(0.001)

Corruption Rank (TPI)

0.203

0.152

(0.132)

(0.164)

Rule of Law (WGI)

0.024

0.086

(0.055)

(0.051)

Police per 100,000 people
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000)
GNI per capita squared
F statistic
R2 (within)
Adjusted R2 (within)
N

-2.07E-04

-2.05E-04

-2.01E-04

(2.21E-04)

(2.04E-04)

(2.06E-04)

0.006

0.008

0.006

0.000

-0.001

0.002

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.006)

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

0.000

0.000

-0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

10.81
0.311
0.267
302

5.43
0.322
0.279
302

6.45
0.309
0.265
302

3.55
0.359
0.314
263

3.09
0.344
0.296
249

3.17
0.377
0.326
263

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country.

Note: All estimations include country and year fixed effects.
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Table 15 Estimated impact of a 1€/pack tax increase
Illicit share

Price
Coefficient

Average in
sample

Significance
level

FE 7.1

0.101

FE 7.2

Estimation

Elasticity
95% confidence
interval

**

Point estimate
(average in
sample)
3.38

0.101

*

IV 7.1

0.101

IV 7.2

0.101

Increase in illicit share
95% confidence
interval

[0.77, 6.00]

Point estimate
(average in
sample)
0.050

3.33

[-0.21, 6.87]

0.049

[-0.003, 0.102]

***

8.04

[2.32, 13.77]

0.118

[0.034, 0.202]

***

7.38

[1.82, 12.93]

0.114

[0.028, 0.199]

Illicit quantity

[0.011, 0.089]

Increase in illicit quantity

FE 10.1

2,524.4

**

0.78

[0.11, 1.45]

646.6

[44.2, 1249.0]

FE 10.2

2,524.4

*

0.75

[-.08, 1.59]

620.2

[-123.9, 1364.2]

IV 10.1

2,524.4

***

2.54

[0.72, 4.36]

2,977.0

[-316.9, 6270.8]

IV 10.2

2,524.4

***

2.21

[0.97, 3.46]

2,425.3

[434.0, 4416.6]

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Figures
Figure 1. Estimated market share of illicit trade in cigarettes
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Notes: Data from Euromonitor. Market share is in terms of quantities of cigarettes.
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Figure 2. Estimated volume of illicit European trade in cigarettes

Volume of illicit trade in cigarettes (billion sticks)
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Notes: Data from Euromonitor. Western Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom; Eastern Europe includes Belarus, BosniaHerzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
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Figure 3: Cigarette prices and IRTC shares in the EU, 2013
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Notes: Variables constructed using source data from Euromonitor as described in the text. Currency units are 2010 euros.
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Figure 4: Cigarette prices and IRTC shares in the EU, 2000-2013
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Notes: The line of best fit is calculated via OLS regression. See also notes to Figure 3.
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Figure 5: Country-demeaned cigarette prices and IRTC shares in the EU, 2000-2013
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Note: For each country, the average of the time-series of each variable has been subtracted from the data. The line of best fit (slope = 0.83) is
calculated via OLS regression. See also notes to Figure 3.
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Figure 6: Cigarette prices and taxes in the EC, 2000-2013
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Notes: The line of best fit is calculated via OLS regression (R2 = 0.954). See also notes to Figure 3.
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Figure 7: Cigarette prices and illicit market share in the EC, 1999-2013
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